Jaime Giménez Sánchez de la Blanca
06/01/2012
Introduction
Every political community who wants to have an independent voice in the international community claims for its statehood. It seems that achieving the status of state is the first step to reach the national goals. Although in the recent years a lot of scholars have tried to expose the crisis of the state (and, in particular, the crisis of the nation-state) the reality shows that the state is still the key actor in the international relations. Since 1648, when the Peace of Westphalia stabilized the European national borders, the state has been the main political organization. Used to rule the different human communities and manage the relations among them, three and a half centuries after Westphalia the state is still essential to understand the present world. Hence, it is not coincidence that the problem of recognition of new states is still so controversial. If reaching the status of state is crucial to have a choice to fight in the political arena to improve the life conditions of your national community, and the only way to turn into a state is being recognized by the already existing states, then the issue of recognition becomes essential in a dynamic world like ours.
The required criteria of statehood have been stated by important scholars[i] and agreed in different international treaties[ii]. However, there is not yet a unified criterion in the practice. This is the central problem. The arbitrariness of the states seems to be the most decisive criterion. So the real requirements for recognition of new states are, in most of cases, based on national interest of the already existing states. Obviously, the capability of implementing the measures according to its interests depends, fundamentally, on the strength of each country. For example, a very powerful country could act with more freedom in the field of International Relations: It could decide to recognize those new states which could improve its geopolitical position and choose to do not recognize those which could put in risk its supremacy. On the other hand, a weaker state could not implement always its own policy of recognition and would have to accept, in most cases, the decision of the great powers. The freedom that the weak state enjoys will depend on how important each particular case is for the great power. So the weaker states are in a subordinate position due to their vulnerabilities. They lack complete autonomy within International Relation field.[iii]
Thus, there is no equality among the countries in the international arena[iv]. Of course, there is no power equality. But, what is worse, there is not legal equality, at least in the practice. Even though this should be one of the main principles of International Law[v], the truth is that the international legal order lacks of a tough coercive system which ensure legal effectiveness[vi]. This allows the powerful states breaking international law without receiving a penalty. One of the latest examples of this was the United States invasion of Iraq on March 2003 without the permission of the United Nations. The US broke the very fundamental principles of International Law and began an “illegal” war, but this country has never been punished for it. No state in the world can challenge the American military supremacy for the moment, because no one is enough strong to implement the penalty that US deserves according to the international rules violated[vii].
This problem responds to the absence of a global institution with the required power to ensure the rule of International Law. Actually, the lack of this kind of actor is the reason because the state is still today the most important figure in the international relations. The states are reticent to transfer part of their sovereignty to a higher instance. They do not want to lose their power of managing every single issue of their foreign affairs[viii]. Some scholars have theorized this fact as the “anarchy in international relations”. Some of them (mainly the realist and the liberal international relations theorists) watch this situation as an inevitable feature of the international system[ix], while others (the constructivists) prefer to think that, instead of inherent, this “anarchy” is just the choice that states have done for the moment, and could change whenever they decide so[x].
Focusing on the issue of state recognition, the question is: If recognition of new states is such a relevant matter in international relations, why it does not exist a unified and centralized empowered organization that, using democratic and plural processes, have the monopoly of decisions on which new states are recognized by the international community and which are not?
Important international law experts like Lauterpacht have already thought about this matter and purposed the creation of an institution like this[xi]. Nowadays, international community has an organization that could perfectly fulfill most of the requirements: The United Nations. It is the forum where the states debate multilaterally about the international affairs. But this organization, even its only existence means a huge step, is not perfect. One of the problems is that the UN is not at all democratic (because of the main role of the Security Council, an organ with no decision-making equality among its members[xii]). Another problem is, as we mentioned above, the lack of an effective punitive system that ensure the observance of international law.
Statehood and the Third World
The weaker states are the most damaged by the current international system. Most of times, the indifference is the treat that they receive from the great powers. However, sometimes they jump to the first line of the international agenda. Examples of this are the recent cases of recognition of new states. For instance, South Sudan was recently recognized by powerful states like the USA, China or Germany and is also a member of the UN General Assembly. After the nasty war that took place in Darfur a few years ago[xiii], the great powers have moved beyond the indifference to the diplomacy action. Also after another bloody conflict, Kosovo reached the independence of Serbia and recognition as a state by the USA and some other countries. Nevertheless, in this case NATO gave military support to the Kosovo Albanians, helping them to reach statehood[xiv]. We will have time to study this and other empirical examples later.
Taking a look to recent world history we have checked that, in the last six decades, most of the new born states are geographically situated in what we call the Third World. This fact, along with the relevant position of recognition in international relations, was the main reason that made us deciding for the topic of this essay.
The States in the Third World have common characteristics with those of the First World. There are historical differences. In Africa, for instance, independent states were created more than three centuries later than in Europe. Of course, this causes a big gap between them. But, as we are willing to show, they are similar according to the theoretical aspects.
States, also in the Third World, are not external to the society. States are not autonomous, they are in the society. Moreover, the symbolic dimension of the state is quite important. States are not only bureaucracy, policies and institutions. Furthermore, states in the Third World need to legitimize physical coercion and political power. An effective state requires the obedience of its habitants without the need of using the force. Discourses and imageries, part of the symbolic feature of the state, help to stabilize the domination in its territory. However, states are product of a historical process. In the case of Third World, states experienced the pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial stages. Path dependence, the particular history of each territory, actively influenced each state[xv].
Particular history of each region is the main cause of the gap between rich and poor countries. European powers held for several centuries the domination over their colonies. This contributed decisively to the inferior position that the Third World states currently hold. During the colonization period, the economy of the colonies was based in the exportation of raw materials. For its part, colonial powers produced and exported manufactured goods. This world commercial structure still remains today[xvi]. However, each empire had its own working methods. So the world is so divided not by two (developed and developing countries), but by a lot of different realities. It is a multidimensional world.
According to Mohammed Ayoob, weakness is the main attribute that differentiates Third World states from the developed ones. This weakness is located in two key areas: State sovereignty and position in the world market. Thus, developing states are characterized by military and political weakness and by economic and technological dependency. Politico-military feebleness is the most important of both issued. It provokes a huge security problem in the Third World states. Developed world does not listen to the economical demands of the developing countries due to that weakness in the politico-military field. Therefore, the main concern is the reduction of their many vulnerabilities (above all, lack of internal cohesion that generates conflicts and insecurity)[xvii].
Behavior of states in international relations is determined by their own perception of themselves. The awareness of their own weakness influences the way of acting of the Third World states. On the other hand, powerful states act accordingly to their prominent position. Depending on its geo-political weight, a state can be considered as a power. Among the powers, it can be distinguished different levels (superpowers, great and regional powers). However, they all have in common capacity of influence over weaker states. During last decades some developing states have reached the status of power. For instance, Brazil, Nigeria and South Africa are considered regional powers. But also there are former Third World states which have become great powers. China is unquestionably one of them. But also India is very close to it.[xviii]
In this paper we will deeply examine the issue of recognition of new states. First, analyzing the different theories about recognition. And, secondly, describing and comparing different historical cases which took place in the Third World. We will approach to the topic with a comparative method. With this methodology we will try to find the main causes that determine the recognition or non-recognition of new states. We will also try to state the solution that, in our opinion, would be the best for solving the problem of recognition.
Theories about Recognition of States
“A political community with considerable viability, controlling a certain area of territory and having statehood as its objective, may go through a period of travail before that objective has been achieved”[xix]. As Ian Brownlie asserts in this sentence, obtaining international recognition as a state is not a smooth process. Contrary to what one might think, fulfilling the common agreed requirements it is not enough for a political community reaching the status of state.
The recognition of a state is a unilateral act, carried out by an already existing sate, which express its consent with the statehood of the new entity. When it achieves recognition, as Hans Kelsen writes, the new state becomes a subject of international law. Namely, it begins to be subject of the rights and duties common to every state[xx]. Nevertheless, Mikulas Fabry has another opinion about the relevance of the act of recognition. For him “recognition does not affect statehood as such or a state’s international rights and obligations. It is a formality of very specific kind: a prerequisite for establishing diplomatic ties.”[xxi] However, both Kelsen and Mikulas agree on that recognizing a state is, for the state that recognizes, to establish diplomatic relations with the new one.
Even the criteria that make a state to be such are, as we will see, internal (population, territory, etc.), is required the external approval (recognition of the rest of states) to reach the condition of state. So, a state does not exist legally unless the others accept its existence. Statehood, then, is a relative and not absolute attribute.
The theoretical tradition about state recognition is divided in two groups. On the one hand, we find the declaratory theory. The academics who support this point of view say that the act of recognizing a new state means that this new political entity observe all the requisites needed to be a state. This requirements were set out in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States: "the state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states."[xxii] So, according to the declaratory theory, the recognition of states is a mere legal act. Every existing state should recognize as a new state any political community which fulfills these four points. Brownlie adds one more. He asserts the necessity of a degree of temporal permanence. The political community who aims to become a state must fulfill the requisites during a certain period to show its statehood.
On the other hand, the constitutive theory affirms that the act of recognition is more a political decision than a legal acknowledgment. Hence, recognition of new states depends chiefly on the arbitrariness of the already existing states.
These conflicting viewpoints agree on one issue. The duty of recognition does not exist. None state has the obligation of recognizing a political community as a new state, even if it fulfills perfectly all the requirements to be declared as such. However, Brownlie warns that “in deeper sense, if an entity bears the mark of statehood, other states put themselves at risk legally if they ignore the basic obligations of state relations”.[xxiii]
The four requirements collected in the Montevideo Convention are usually used by the candidates to claim for their statehood. Nevertheless, not all the four are watched as equal importance. Historically, having and stable and effective government, as well as enjoying full independence and sovereignty have been more important issues than those about population and territorial boundaries. Rosalyn Cohen shows with some examples of United Nations historical practice. For instance, while Israel and Albania were recognized as states and admitted as UN members even they did not have a clearly defined territory, Mongolia, was not because of the argument of lack of real independence. After studying Mongolia’s episode Cohen concludes that “the political pressure being exercised at the time caused a deviation from legal norms on the issue of statehood.”[xxiv]
It is important to distinguish between de facto and de jure recognition. When a political community manages to fulfill all the statehood requirements, it becomes a de facto state. Namely, it is not a complete state because it is not recognized by the others states yet, but, as it has all the requisites, it is a state in the practice. When this entity is internationally recognized it becomes a de jure state. During this interim period it is, in technical words, a “State in statu nascendi”. An existing state could begin informal relations with this entity. This would mean a de facto recognition. Normally, sooner or later, this is followed by a formal recognition (de jure). But there are exceptional cases (like Palestine, for example) that never reach the complete statehood.
According to Mikulas, a new state could be born externally or internally. In the first case, a state would be born externally after the threat or use of force of one state to another. This will give birth to a satellite a puppet state. In the other case, a new state could be born after an internal process. This could be secession, after dissolution, merge or decolonization[xxv]. In this internal state creation processes, the idea of self-determination is very important. During the last two hundred years this concept has been one of the the keys in the recognition policies. Nevertheless, as Robert Caplan states, the recognition of secessionist entities is usually more restrictive. Recognizing secession could violate both the international law principle of respect to the territorial integrity of another state and the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs.[xxvi] Also, states must take into account that the premature recognition is forbidden by international law. Even there is no duty to recognize, states must realize that not everything is allowed. It is illegal to recognize a new state prematurely. If a state recognizes a secessionist entity before than it assembles the appropriate requirements, it will commit an illegal action.
The main discussion about recognition has been between both declaratory and constitutive theorists. However, some academics have tried to synthesize both perspectives. One of the most famous attempts was that of Hersch Lauterpacht. He wrote this: “although recognition is thus declaratory of an existing fact, such declaration, made in the impartial fulfillment of a legal duty, is constitutive, as between the recognizing State and the new community, of international rights and duties associated with full statehood. Prior to recognition such rights and obligations exist only to the extent to which they have been expressly conceded or legitimately asserted by reference to compelling rules of humanity and justice, either by the existing members of international society or by the community claiming recognition.”[xxvii] As Lauterpacht says, recognition is both declaratory and constitutive. It is a legal act that should be guided exclusively by legal criteria. The problem is that the actors who must carry out these actions, the states, do no act like they should. Far away from Lauterpacht’s idealism, states are self-interested. The rational choice theory, used by the realists’ international relations theorists, explains better how states makes decision concerning to recognition of new states. They look for the best for themselves.
Even so, as Kelsen recalls, the recognition of states “is the establishment of a fact; it is not the expression of a will”.[xxviii]
Historical cases about recognition
As we said above, statehood is a relative attribute because it depends largely on the others’ perception. To demonstrate this, the best example that we can find nowadays is the Republic of Somaliland. This entity is not recognized by any state of the world although it fulfills all the objective statehood requirements. It is what we call a “quasi-state”. On the other hand, Somalia, Somaliland’s parent state, is the perfect example of a failed state. Mogadiscio’s government does not rule in its own country, but Somalia is still widely recognized as a state. This is just an example to show how arbitrary is the real criteria that most of states uses to recognize (or non-recognize) other states. The biggest problem that a de facto state like Somaliland faces is that the state that is legally recognized to rule on that territory (Somalia) could legally displace Somaliland from the quasi-state condition that is now enjoying. In other words, until the Republic of Somaliland does not achieve the complete statehood it will suffer a high risk of losing its own-ruled condition.
It does not seem that Somaliland will obtain international recognition in the short term. In our research for this essay we have found out that one of the main causes that allow a new state to be recognized de jure is the support of a friendly state. Somaliland lacks of this support. Ethiopia should be its most likely option, but right now it prefers a divided Somalia, easier to dominate. For Steve Kibble the loneliness of Somaliland is the main cause of the international indifference[xxix]. Analyzing other historical cases, we realize the huge importance of the international support. For instance, while Bangladesh achieved the independence of Pakistan and international recognition, Biafra and Katanga suffered a big defeat in their respective secession attempts. In addition to the geographical specificities (Bangladesh had the advantage of the physical separation of its parent state), the most important reason that determine the destiny of this secession attempts was that Bangladesh had the sympathy of India, while neither Biafra nor Katanga had the international community on their side. India, as regional power with influence all over South Asia, supported East Pakistan against Islamabad’s government. The big rivalry between India and Pakistan played a key role in the success of Bangladesh. India gave both, military and diplomatic support to Bangladesh. After Bhutan, India was the first country that recognized Bangladesh as state. In few time the rest of the world did the same[xxx].
Cases of Biafra and Katanga are very different. During the sixties, just after reaching independence of European colonialist powers, different problems in the new African states came to light. One problem was the unequal distribution of power among the regions and tribes into these new states. This is, for example, a structural cause in Somalia’s conflict (after decolonization Somalis political system gave more power to the south than to the north, where Somaliland is located). It is also key in Biafra. This eastern region of Nigeria claimed for independence to avoid the submission to the north. The Ibo’s (majoritarian ethnic group of Biafra, but a minority in Nigeria) government of Biafra declared the independence and the civil war began. In 1970, after three years of extremely bloody conflict, Biafra was defeated. Before, Biafra was recognized as a sovereign state by five states (Gabon, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Tanzania and Zambia). France, Portugal or South Africa gave military and financial support to Biafra, but they did not recognize it. However, this was not enough for the success of Biafra. The USA, which before showed sympathy for Biafra, finally did not support it. For their part, Great Britain and USSR defended Nigeria[xxxi][xxxii].
Similar to Biafra, Katanga’s attempt of independence also failed. Just after the Belgian decolonization and the creation of the Democratic Republic of Congo, in 1960, the southern region of Katanga proclaimed its independence. Katanga is a rich area in mineral resources like copper. Belgian companies were very interested in keeping control of Katanga’s mines beyond the colonial period. Nevertheless, Katanga’s secession attempt was unsuccessful, once again, because of the lack of enough foreign support[xxxiii]. The USA, one more time, changed its initial support to the secessionist entity into rejection. Of course, the major geopolitical context was very important in its decision. During the conflict, the soviet influence over Congo’s government increased. Then, the USA viewed Katanga with sympathy. But after Congo’s president Lulumba, close to the USSR, was assassinated, the USA changed its position and didn’t support Katanga anymore. In fact, the UN Security Council approved the intervention of UN troops in the conflict and allowed them to use the force. This was used as an instrument to defeat Katanga and stabilize the area[xxxiv]. Katanga was never recognized by any state. This episode is a perfect example of how superpowers watched the world as a huge chessboard during the Cold War.
As we have seen, in last fifty years secessionist attempts have had very different endings. Self-determination principle conflicts with territorial integrity of the states. In 1970 former UN Secretary-General U Thant said: “As far as the question of secession of a particular section of a Member State is concerned, the United Nations' attitude is unequivocal. As an international organization, the United Nations has never accepted and does not accept and I do not believe it will ever accept the principle of secession of a part of its Member State”.[xxxv] Although few years later the UN admitted Bangladesh as a member, the UN doctrine is very restrictive with secessionist entities. Same as the former Organization of African Unity (now called African Union), which had the sacrosanct principle of the inviolability of colonial borders. This was recently broken with the independence of South Sudan, widely recognized as new state. But this was not the first time. Also in 1993 Eritrea was separated of Ethiopia.
Eritrean case has been compared to Somaliland’s. Why Eritrea achieved international recognition and Somaliland did not? They share common features like the close location (both are situated in the Horn of Africa) or the recent history: in the early 1990’s both fought and won their respective wars against their parent states. Now, according to Hussein M. Adam, the big difference between them is the way they reached and managed the victory. Eritrea achieved an undisputed military victory against Ethiopia. After that, 99% of Eritrean people said yes to independence with a referendum watched by international observers. These facts gave enough legitimacy to the Eritrean state and it was internationally recognized in 1993, also by Ethiopia. For its part, Somaliland did not achieve so good military performance; it has not celebrated a referendum and Somalia is not ready to recognize the Republic of Somaliland as a state[xxxvi].
There are much more cases of political entities who have claimed for statehood. Some of them have succeeded and some others have failed. Nowadays, entities like Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Palestine, Kosovo, Taiwan, Dniester Moldovan Republic, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia or Turkish Republic of the Northern Cyprus are struggling for international recognition[xxxvii]. Western Sahara is recognized by 58 states and the African Union but its exiled government can hardly rule in Saharawi territory, occupied by Morocco. On the other hand, the Republic of China, better known as Taiwan, is recognized by only 23 countries, but the effectiveness of its government as well as its complete sovereignty over its territory cannot be disputed. The rivalry with the Democratic Republic of China brings put this situation.
Kosovo is one of the most controversial cases. It is recognized by 85 states, including the USA, Japan and most of the European Union. But the strong opposition of Serbia, its parent state, and its ally Russia, makes very difficult the complete international recognition and its admission in the UN. Kosovo declared unilateral independence in 2008 with the American support. The legality of that declaration has been contested, but the International Court of Justice has ratified its legality[xxxviii].
But the best known case is that of Palestine. State of Palestine is recognized by 127 states out of 193. This means that 65% of existing states have recognize Palestine. This is not enough, though, to achieve complete recognition. The USA does not recognize Palestine as a state, neither the UN. After more than sixty years of arab-isreali conflict, the solution could be close. But peace can only be reached with the official recognition of the State of Palestine by Israel and its integration in the UN as a full-fledged member.
Conclusions
Statehood is a multidimensional concept which needs both internal and external factors. A political community must fulfill some requirements to be prepared to acquire statehood. Nonetheless, this is not enough. As the empirical cases show, having international support is even more important.
The Republic of Somaliland is a quite clear case. Somaliland is an autonomous region of the north of Somalia which has eliminated warlordism. The government of Somaliland is able to control its territory. In contrast, the internationally recognized government of Somali state have not effective rule in the country. This paradox demonstrates the odd application of the principle of recognition of states.
Comparing Somaliland’s case with others examples, we come to the conclusion that having the support of a powerful state is more important than fulfilling the formal requirements of statehood. This kind of alliance is the necessary nudge that a political community needs to achieve international recognition as a state. The case of Bangladesh is perfect to show this. Thanks to the support of India, East Pakistan managed to reach complete independence. Similar case to Kosovo, the US protégé. On the other hand, Biafra, Katanga and Somaliland are an obvious example to the contrary. None of them counted with a powerful ally. None of them have been recognized.
Eritrea shows that there is an alternative. Not everything is about having an important ally. Eritrea reached the international recognition because it managed to give enough legitimacy to itself. With an outstanding military victory against its former parent state and a resounding success of the popular referendum of independence, Eritrea was able to justify its statehood towards the international community.
The main debate about recognition of states in academic world revolves around the legal or political nature of the issue. Declaratory and constitutive theories have opposite points of view. The first maintains that recognition is a mere legal act carried out by existing state when it verifies the statehood of the emerging entity. The second theory focuses in the political aspect. It sees recognition as a political action guided by the arbitrariness of existing states. However, our study finds that both are partly right. States are arbitrary in their decisions but also consider the objective facts. However, we would say that the constitutive theory is closer to reality.
Lauterpacht hits the mark with this quite lucid analysis: “To recognize a community as a State is to declare that it fulfills the conditions of statehood as required by international law. If these conditions are present, existing States are under the duty to grant recognition. In the absence of an international organ competent to ascertain and authoritatively to declare the presence of requirements of full international personality, States already established fulfill that function in their capacity as organs of international law. In thus acting they administer the law of nations. This rule of law signifies that in granting or withholding recognition States do not claim and are not entitled to serve exclusively the interests of their national policy and convenience regardless of the principles of international law in the matter.”[xxxix]
States should have the duty to recognize a political entity as a state when it fulfills all the requirements. However, the optimum scenario would include an international organization with the exclusive ability of the recognition of states. Namely, this organization would be the only actor able to recognize or non-recognize new states. This organization should function with democratic procedures. But, to make this possible, the international community should go beyond the Westphalian stage. Globalization has begun the job, but the idea of sovereign nation-states is still quite strong. Our proposition would not abolish completely the sovereignty of states. They should just transfer some of their competences to create a fairer international system.
In our opinion, most of the states that exists nowadays would likely agree with this proposition. The problem is that the powerful states likely would not. They are not ready to cede their prominent position without compensation. Great powers prefer this arbitrary international system than a just one. In the short term this situation is better for them because they can enforce their interest to the rest. But in in the long term this unfair scene will produce general dissatisfaction, instability and conflicts. However, that situation is not likely to change fundamentally in the short and medium term.
The secretary of the Somaliland Chamber of Commerce told once to the Financial Times that “we cannot enter into formal trade agreements; we cannot even contact the outside through direct postal services, as we are not a member of the postal union”[xl]. Well, they will have to keep waiting.
Notes:
[i] Hans Kelsen (1941) or Ian Brownlie (1966) inter alia.
[ii] One of the most famous treaties about recognition is the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, signed in 1933 by the United States and most of the Latin American countries.
[iii] Ayoob, Mohammed. The Third World Security Predicament : State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System (Emerging Global Issues, 1995).
[iv] Walker, R.B. J., “International/Inequality”, In Pasha, Mustapha Kamal & Murphy, Craig N. (eds.): International Relations and the New Inequality (International Studies Review Presidential Series, 2002)
[v] In fact, the first principle stated in the United Nations Charter says: “1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members”. Charter of the United Nations (1945).
[vi] Potter, Pitman B. “Bases and Effectiveness of International Law, 1968”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 63, No. 2 (1969), pp. 270-272
[vii] When the United States of America began the 2003 attack on Iraq (both countries are members of the United Nations) violated at least these two principles of the Charter of this organization: “2. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. 3. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Charter of the United Nations (1945).
[viii] The state members of the European Union seem to be the exception. Even there are lots of regional organizations all over the world; none of them have gone as far as the EU. It is a very slow process, but step by step the European nations walk towards the integration. Although they do not have a unified foreign affairs policy yet, it is not unreasonable to think that the integration will be complete in the future.
[ix] Mearsheimer, John. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton & Company (2001).
[x] Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics". International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, (1992), pp. 391–425.
[xi] Lauterpacht, H. “Recognition of States in International Law”. The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 53, No. 3 (1944), pp. 385-458
[xii] “The Security Council originally consisted of 11 members—five permanent members (the Republic of China [Taiwan], France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and six nonpermanent members elected by the UN General Assembly for two-year terms. An amendment to the UN Charter in 1965 increased council membership to 15, including the original five permanent members and 10 nonpermanent members. (…) Each member has one vote. On all “procedural” matters—the definition of which is sometimes in dispute—decisions by the council are made by an affirmative vote of any nine of its members. Substantive matters, such as the investigation of a dispute or the application of sanctions, also require nine affirmative votes, including those of the five permanent members holding veto power.” (“United Nations Security Council”, Encyclopædia Britannica). As we see in this definition, the UN Security Council, the organ which makes the important decisions in the UN, has five permanent members with power of veto. This means that these five states (China, France, Great Britain, Russia and the USA) have more legal power than the rest of members of the organization. Therefore, the United Nations is not a democratic organization but oligarchic.
[xiii] Deng, Francis M. “Sudan: A Nation in Turbulent Search of Itself”, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 603 (2006), pp. 155-162
[xiv] Weller, Marc. Contested Statehood. Kosovo’s struggle for independence, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 191-219, 259-283.
[xv] Hackman, Tobias & Péclard, Didier. Negotiating Statehood. Dynamics of Power and Domination in Africa (Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), pp. 1-23
[xvi] Burnell, Peter & Randall, Vicky. Politics in de Developing World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
[xvii] Ayoob, Mohammed. The Third World Security Predicament : State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System (Emerging Global Issues, 1995).
[xviii] Wæver, Ole & Barry Buzan. Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
[xix] Brownlie, Ian. Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 77.
[xx] Kelsen, Hans. “Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations”. The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 35, No. 4 (1941), pp. 605-617
[xxi] Fabry, Mikulas. International Society and the Establishment of New States Since 1776 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010)
[xxii] Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933)
[xxiii] Brownlie, Ian. Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 89.
[xxiv] Cohen, Rosalyn. “The Concept of Statehood in United Nations Practice”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 109, No. 8 (1961), pp. 1127-1171.
[xxv] Fabry, Mikulas. International Society and the Establishment of New States Since 1776 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010)
[xxvi] Caplan, Richard. Europe and the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 15-145.
[xxvii] Lauterpacht, H. “Recognition of States in International Law”. The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 53, No. 3 (1944), pp. 385-458
[xxviii] Kelsen, Hans. (1941).
[xxix] Kibble, Steve. “Somaliland: Surviving Without Recognition; Somalia: Recognised but Failing”, International Relations, Vol. 15, No. 5, (2001), pp. 5-25.
[xxx] Rafiqul Islam, M. “Secessionist Self-Determination: Some Lessons from Katanga, Biafra and Bangladesh”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 22, No. 3 (1985), pp. 211-221.
[xxxi] Rafiqul Islam, M. (1985).
[xxxii] Jervis, Steven. “Nigeria and Biafra”, Africa Today, Vol. 14, No. 6, (1967), pp. 16-18.
[xxxiii] Lemarchand, Rene. “The Limits of Self-Determination: The Case of the Katanga Secession”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 56, No. 2 (1962), pp. 404-416.
[xxxiv] Gonze, Collin. "Katanga Secession: The New Colonialism”, Africa Today, Vol. 9, No. 1, (1962), pp. 4-6+12+16
[xxxv] UN Monthly Chronicle (1970), no. 2, p. 2.
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